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Case No. 8150 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH . 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
v~ . 
. JOHNNY DeHERRERA, JOE V AI_.jDEZ 
and RA YNIOND 0. l\1ARTTNEZ, 
srrATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants. 
The appellants above-named \vere charged with the 
offense of robbery. The case \vas tried before the 
Court sitting \vithout a jury. At the conclusion of the 
State's case, defendants 1nade a motion to dismiss the 
information and to discharge the defendants. The 
grounds for the 1notions \vere as follo\vs ( Tr. 37, 38) : 
1. That the State failed to prove the corpus de-
licti of th'e offense charged; 
~. That the Stat0 failed to prove that the crin1e 
of robbery was committed; and 
3. That the State failed to prove that the defend-
ants, or any of them, \vere guilty of the offenRe 
charged. 
~rhe motion for dismissal was denied by the trial 
court. Defendants offered no testimony in their own 
behalf and rested. The eourt then found the defendants 
guilt.~r a~ chargPcl. 
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STATE~IEN~r OF FAC~TS 
The facts as appear in the record are as follows: 
On the evening of June 19, 1953~ the eo1nplaining witness, 
a 1nan .by the name of Thomas Edwards, attended a 
baseball game at John Affleck Park in Ogden (Tr. 3). 
The ga1ne was over at 10:30 o'clock P. M. and Edwards 
'vent fron1 the park to Kay's Bar on 25th Street in 
Ogden to buy cigarettes ( r~rr. 2). While there he n1et 
defendants and began talking with then1 (Tr. 2), sat 
do,vn with them (Tr. 2), and bought them all a beer 
(~rr. 6, 35), had a conversation with them about some 
\Vomen (Tr. 10), and left less than half an hour after 
his arrival (Tr. 9). 
He testified that when he 'vas leaving two of thr 
defendants grabbed him and shoved hiln into a car 
(Tr. 2). He didn't see anyone on the streets. When 
he got in the car everything \Vent blank (Tr. 2). He 
testified that he guessed they hit him (Tr. 3). He 
gained consciousness 'vhen he 'vas do,vn in the wilds 
by the river and they 'vere heating him up (Tr. 3), and 
'vhen he beca1ne unconscious they would either revive 
hin1 or wait until he regained consciousness and then 
beat him some more (Tr. 3, 4, 8, 12, 13). He testified 
that he had about $27.00 on his person during the after-
noon at about quitting ti1ne; that he had made some 
s1nall expenditures prior to the time when he met the 
defendants (Tr. 5); that he spent money in the tavern 
(Tr. 5); and that he never counted his money in Kay's 
Tavern (Tr. 33). About 2:30 the follo,ving morning a 
member of a train cre\v in the Ogden railroad yards 
called the police when he noticed somebody near the 
right-of-way, without any clothes on, run out toward 
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the engine he 'vas operating, and noticed somebody else 
come out of the shadows, hit him and drag him back 
(Tr. 12). The officers arrived on the scene three or 
four minutes after receiving the call (Tr. 20) about 
2 :30 a. n1. ( Tr. 13) on West Rushton ( Tr. 13), saw a 
black 1946 Ford Coupe standing there, and saw the 
defendants Martinez and DeHerrera standing behind 
the car (Tr. 14). They saw them throw som·ething into 
the \veeds. It was a pair of shorts (Tr. 14). There was 
a watch, a \Vallet, and a lighter (Tr. 7) found on the 
ground at the scene and identified as those of the coin-
plaining \vitness. They 'vere offered in evidence along 
.,vith his shorts and trousers (Tr. 36). Also found at 
the scene were a ring ( Tr. 15, 17) and so1ne nail clips 
( Tr. 16, 17), and ·a handkerchief \vith lipstick on it ( Tr. 
16) which the complaining witness said did not belong 
to him ( Tr: 36, 37). Four or five empty beer bottles 
'vere found in the car (Tr. 19). There was evidence of 
a fight (Tr. 18); "evidence quite a bit that looked like 
a struggle had gone on, the ground was messed up" 
( Tr. 18) ; and there \Vas a pool of blood on the ground 
(rrr. 18). ~rhe complaining 'vitness 'vas beaten severly 
err. 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 13)' was knocked out more than once 
(Tr. 4, 8), says he heard the defendants say they \Vere 
going to beat and fjnish him off (Tr. 4, 8), and was 
heard to screan1 for help (Tr. 22, 23) and say "Don't 
let him kill me" (Tr. 23). 
This is the substance of the material evidence. 
ARGlJMENT 
It is to be noted at the outset that the specific 
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'•rrhat the said defendants did then and 
there wilfully and unla"\\rfully take 'vith force 
and violence from Thomas Edwards the follo,v-
ing property: A wallet and approxilnately $30.00 
in United States InonPy." 
State1nent of Points: 
A. The court ·erred in denying defendants' motion 
to dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiff's case. 
B. That the judgment of the court 'vas against the 
facts and evidence. 
C~. That the State failed to prove that the crime of 
robbery was committed. 
D. That the State failed to prove the corpus delicti 
of the offense charged. 
E. That the State failed to prove that the defend-
ants were, or that any of the1n was, guilty of 
· the offense charged. 
These points are so closely related, and the facts 
so inter"\voven, that 've shall consolidate them for pur-
poses of this argument. 
Section 76-51-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines 
the crime of robbery as follows: 
"Robbery is the felonious taking of personal 
property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accon1plished by means of force or fear." 
Every robbery includes grand larceny and a case 
of robbery cannot be stated without stating a case of 
larceny. Section 76-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
defines larceny as "the felonious stealing, taking, carry-
ing·* * * away the personal property of another." 
·~ 4 
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See State vs. Donoven, 77 lT. 343, 294 P. 1108. 
It is necessary to find that the intent to steal ex-
isted at the time of the taking. 
See People vs. Miller~ 4 l!. 410, 11 P. 514; 
State v. Allen, 56 U. 37, 189 P. 84. 
The taking must be 'vith the felonious intent to steal, 
and this element must he established by the circum-
stances of the taking. 
State vs. Dubois, 64 lT. 433, 231 P. 625. 
The rule as to possession of recently stolen property 
has been upheld as to robbery. 
State v. Don oven, supra. 
We have carefully read the transcript of the testi-
Inony introduced by the State and have been unable to 
find any facts to support the charge of a felonious 
taking of the specified personal property, or any prop-
erty, fro1n the complaining 'vitness, against his will, 
or accomplished by means of force and fear, or at all. 
The lower court grappled 'vith this precise point and 
resolved it 'vith this highly interesting and significant 
statement: 
"THE COURT: Well, I think the facts and cir-
cumstances point to the guilt of the three de-
fendants in taking the purse or 'vallet, although 
I am impressed and I do believe from the testi-
mony offered that the greatest offense was some-
thing other than robbery, but robbery came into 
the picture, but there was intent to steal during 
the processes of that evening and before it was 
over a robbery was committed. From th'e testi-
Inony it sounds like they wanted to beat him up 
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for the fun of beating him up and for the ilnmoral 
conduct, so the record may show the Court finds 
the defendants guilty as charged in the infor-
mation." 
An analysis of that staten1ent of the trial court, we 
believe, will disclose what \ve contend is the basic error 
of the trial court: that the complaining \vitness suffered 
a severe beating and certain moral indignities, which 
undoubtedly incensed the trial court to the point where 
he felt that the defendants should be severely punished, 
and that the only adequate punishment he could mete 
out \Vas to find them guilty of robbery. For the beating 
and the indignities we make no brief. But to have found 
them guilty of robbery on the record in this case we 
submit is Inanifestly unjustified. 
First the court said: 
"Well, I think the facts and circu1nstances point 
to the guilt of the three defendants in taking the 
purse or wallet * * * ." 
As to this, there is no evidence in the record that any one 
of the defendants ever so much as had the wallet in his 
hand. The complaining witness hin1self never said that 
any one of them took his wallet. Nor did anyone else so 
testify. The \Vallet was found deep· in the bushes where 
one of the officers speculated that it had been thrown. 
And oddly enough the \Vallet was supposed to have con-
tained the greater part of $27.00; but none of that money 
was ever found on any one of the defendants, or at the 
scene of the fight, or at all. Presumably the wallet con-
tained currency, if, in fact, it contained any money at all. 
Wallets are usually used for currency. Purses more 
frequently carry change or silver. But no currency or 
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other money was found anywhere.. That being true, if 
the complaining witness had had the money he claimed, 
and had had it taken from him by the defendants, it 
would have been found on one of them, or at the scene 
of the trouble. But the record is completely silent as to 
money. 
So the trial court, to find robbery, had to do so by 
pyramiding inferences upon inferences, as \Ve will point 
out. 
The first inference, in the absence of proof, would 
have to be that one or more of the defendants took the 
wallet of the complaining witness with its contents of 
money. The second inference \vould have to be that he 
(an unidentified one of the three defendants) threw the 
'vallet away, there being no proof as to how it got in the 
bushes. And the third inference 'vould have to be that 
one or more of the defendants kept the money, having 
had the intent to deprive the O\vner of it. But there was 
no money found on any of the defendants, or at the scene 
of the trouble, or at all, although other articles, much 
more minute, such as a \vatch, a lighter, nailclips and a 
ring, and the 'vallet itRelf, \vere easily observed and 
found. 
There being no 1noney found, it follows logically that 
the foregoing inferences 1nust be founded on the further 
(antecedent) inference that the complaining witness 
actually did have the amount of money in his wallet that 
he said he did, or some lesser amount. No one ever saw 
it, or any part of it; and the complaining \vitness himself 
had not seen it since he left the office that afternoon 
when he said he had counted it in case he "needed some 
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1nore." (Tr. 5, 6). He 'vas to huy groceries for the week 
end. And he said: "I didn't count it after that." 
No'v in vie'v of the fact that no 1noney was ever 
found anywhere, is it not just as logical to assume that 
the complaining \vitness did something else with the 
1noney, som'ething he may not have \Vanted to have to 
explain to his \vife (as he then could not buy the week 
end groceries) or lost it, or bet it on the ball game and 
lost it, or spent it for so1ne purposes best known to hiln-
self, or spent it foolishly, or other,vise-\ve say, is it not 
just as logical to assu1ne one or more of those i~ferences 
as to infer that he was robbed hy these defendants of 
Inoney no one ever sa\v or found, on the defendants, or at 
the scene of the fight, or at all? 
.And so long as we are indulging in inferences, might 
it not be just as logical, too, to infer (as we will hereafter 
point out) that there \vas no robbery intended, that the 
defendants had other things in mind (as the Court 
suggests), that in the fighting the \Vallet as well as the 
other ite1ns of personal property fell out of the pocket 
of the complaining \Vitness, \vas not found by the officers, 
but was found by some stranger who had been attracted 
to the commotion by the arrival of the officers and the 
arrest, who took the money and tossed the wallet into the 
bushes. This ·is certainly not improbable as th:e scene 
of the fighting is in that part of the "wilds" by the river 
generally kno\vn to be inhabited by tramps, floaters and 
transients. 
Then the trial court said : 
"* * * although I am impressed and I do believe 
fron1 the testimony offered that the greatest 
offense was something other than robbery, * * * ." 
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As to this, the record js replete with facts. And with 
logic. Consider that the co1nplaining vvitness left the 
ball game about 10:30 p.m. (Tr. 3), arrived at th~e tavern 
on lower 25th Street in "ten or fifteen minutes" ( Tr. 9), 
and remained there not 1nore than half an hour ( Tr. 9). 
According to his own testimony, then, he left the tavern 
with the defendants about 10:15 or earlier; and that 
when he got in the car "everything went blank. I guess 
they hit me." (Tr. 2). Bet,veen that tin1e and 2:30 a.m., 
1nore than four hours and fifteen minutes later, the beat-
ing and the indignities apparently 'vere taking place. 
It certainly wouldn't have taken the three defendants 
that long to rob hin1. He said himself that after they 
hit him (Tr. 2) he did not regain consciousness until he 
was ''down in the wilds by the river which is Rushton" 
(Tr. 3) and they \vere beating him up. He testified that 
I\:ay's tavern, 'vhere he met the defendants, \vas on 25th 
street, "a block up from the Depot" ( Tr. 2). From there 
to Rushton would be: one block west to Wall Avenue, 
four and one-half blocks north on Wall to Rushton, then 
\Vest on Rushton to the dead-end lane at least one block, 
a total of six and a half of Ogden's long City blocks 
(seven of 'vhich, with the intern1ediate crossings, con-
stitute a mile). Had robbery been their motive they 
could easily have robbed hi1n during this near-mile ride, 
and then have durnped hin1 out, as he was unconscious all 
of that tilne. And if robbery had been their motive that 
is just \vhat they \vould have done; and then fled. 
But no, they did not do that. The trial Court well 
kne'v from the testimony, as he said, supra, that: 
"* * * the greatest offense waR something other 
than robbery, * * *" 
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and also said: 
"* * * From the testimony it sounds like thry 
wanted to beat him up for the fun of beating hhn 
up and for the immoral ronduct, * * *." 
And this occurrence vvas still continuing at 2 :30 a.m. the 
follo,ving morning when the 'vitness Nichols noticed 
someone without any clothes on run to,vard his train, 
and noticed son1eone else coine out of the shadows and 
hit hiln arid drag hiln back ( 'rr. 12). Additional time 
elapsed for Nichols to get to a telephone and call the 
police and for the police to arrive and break up the 
activities, a total elapsed time of approximately four 
and one-half hours. Certainly this is not the conduct or 
the mentality of robbers vvho usually strike and flee. 
Escape is their object, once they have robbed their 
. victim. · But riot so here. These so-called robbers took 
their victim to a dead-end lane, from 'vhich there was 
no escape for theins;elves and proceeded for more than 
four hours 'vith other activities, and noisily too. 
The trial court said, ainong other things, supra: 
"* * * but robbery came into the picture, but 
there was intent to steal during the processes of 
that evening and before it vvas over a robbery was 
committed. * * *" 
But these conclusions are not supported by the evidence 
or by the known characteristics of robbers. They are 
conclusions based solely upon inferences. The trial court 
did not state, nor does the record show, how, when or 
where robbery came into the picture, or how, where or 
when th·e intent to steal vvas formed, or how, when or 
where the robbery was committed, or of what the com-
plaining 'vitness was robbed. The court did find: 
10 
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"* * * the defendants guilty as charged in the 
information." 
but does not say of what he was robbed. Certainly it was 
not the $30.00 originally charged in the co1nplaint, upon 
which the inforrnation 'vas based, or any part of that 
$30.00. And as to these points we challenge the record. 
The only item of personal property seen in the hands of 
the def'endants or any of them 'vas a pair of shorts 'vhich 
officer Torman said he saw one of them thro'v into the 
'veeds (Tr. 14). And the third man was found at that 
time in the bushes 'vith the complaining witness. His 
clothes had been taken off of him, or torn off, and as the 
officers arrived one of the defendants was holding some 
shorts. And not one of the defendant~ tried to run or 
flee. 
1~he finding of the defendants guilty of robbery, 
then, 1nust have been upon the inferences mentioned 
above, plus the inference that a robbery 'vas intended, 
'vhen all the facts point to other intentions, plus the in-
ference that son1ething 'vas taken from the complaining 
'vitness "against his 'vill," and was appropriated by the 
defendants with the intent to deprive the complaining 
'vitness of it. 
N o'v the record is silent on 'vhat caused the fight or 
'vhy the defendants wanted to beat up the complaining 
'vitness or 'vhat, if anything, they had against him. 
Whether they spent more than four hours beating him up 
"for the fun of beating him up," as the trial court ·ob-
served, or for the "immoral conduct" alluded to by the 
trial court, or for both, or for some other purpose, we 
do not kno,v, nor does the record say. But the inescap-
able fact remains that they 'vere not spending four and 
11 
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one-half hours robbing hin1, \vhen he 'vns unconscious 
1nuch of the tilne, and was largely unclothed part of the 
tilne, and during most, if not all of 'Yhich time, he was 
helpless to prevent heing robbed of everything he harl 
including his clothing. 
We sub1nit that the State did not prove any motive 
to rob, or any intent to rob, or any robbery \Vhatever. 
But on thP contrary did prove oth0r 1notives and other 
intents. 
We further submit that in the face of such 1notiveR 
and intents "other than robbery", as the trial court 
observed, it is not legally or other,vise sufficient to build 
a series of inferences into a finding of robbery, even 
though the conduct of the defendants appeared to be 
reprehensible and even though a court might feel im-
pelled to "throw the book," ·so to speak, at the defend-
ants for their misconduct. Nor, \ve submit, is it jus-
tifiable to charge or convict the defendants of rob-
bery, which is not proved, simply because (as appears 
evident here) the prosecutors and the court may have 
felt that the n1aximun1 punishment allo,ved by law for 
an aggravated assault was wholly insufficient. 
C~ONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we further submit (1) that the trial 
court erred, at the conclusion of the State's case, in re-
fusing to grant defendants' motion to dismiss the in-
formation and to discharge the defendants; ·(2) that the 
judgment of the trial court was against the facts and the 
evidence; (3) that the State failed to prove that the 
cr1n1e of robbery \vas committed (whatever else might 
12 
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have been done); ( 4) that the State failed to prove the 
corpus delicti of the offense charged; and (5) that the 
State failed to prove that the defendants were, or that 
any of then1 'vas, guilty of the offense charged. 
Resp·ectfully submitted, 
LEWIS J. WALLACE and 
M. BLAINE PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
13 
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